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INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
Randy J. Kozel*
First Amendment Institutions. By Paul Horwitz. Cambridge and
London: Harvard University Press. 2013. Pp. xiii, 359. $49.95.

Introduction
This Review makes two claims. The first is that Paul Horwitz’s1 excellent
book, First Amendment Institutions, depicts the institutionalist movement in
robust and provocative form. The second is that it would be a mistake to
assume from its immersion in First Amendment jurisprudence (not to mention its title) that the book’s implications are limited to the First Amendment. Professor Horwitz presents First Amendment institutionalism as a
wide-ranging theory of constitutional structure whose focus is as much on
constraining the authority of political government as it is on facilitating expression. These are the terms on which the book’s argument—and, to a
large extent, the leading edge of contemporary institutionalist thinking—
ought to be received, understood, and evaluated.
***
First Amendment institutionalism urges greater attention to the nature
of institutions as producers of speech and domains for individual communication, reflection, and socialization (pp. 8–11). Its central premise is that by
recognizing the unique roles and features of entities such as universities,
newspapers, and churches, courts can develop a better and more coherent
body of constitutional doctrine.
Professor Horwitz develops the institutionalist case for a revised constitutional jurisprudence. He also goes further, asserting that institutions are
more than the sum of their parts. The thrust of his argument is that individual flourishing is best promoted by recognizing the distribution of autonomy among numerous institutions, both public and private. It is not enough
for sovereign authority to be divided between the federal government, the
states, and private citizens. The nonpolitical institutions that people use to

* Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. For helpful comments and
conversations, thanks to Randy Barnett, Amy Barrett, Richard Garnett, Bruce Huber, John
Inazu, Kristine Kalanges, Daniel Kelly, Jennifer Mason McAward, Mark McKenna, Jeffrey
Pojanowski, Zachary Price, Veronica Root, Jay Tidmarsh, and Alexander Tsesis.
1. Gordon Rosen Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law.
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develop their faculties, construct meaning, and exercise freedom must also
be insulated from governmental intrusion.2
We might think of this theory in terms of structural institutionalism3: a
conception of the constitutional order in which various institutions outside
the realm of political government “develop their own visions of what the
First Amendment means” (p. 19). Within the scheme of structural institutionalism, the primary role of the First Amendment is to identify those entities in which autonomy resides. Professor Horwitz does not suggest that
every conceivable organization, or even every important one, carries with it
a zone of autonomy. Such an approach would diminish the sovereign authority of governments beyond recognition. But “First Amendment institutions”—universities, churches, media outlets, and other entities that
comprise the “ ‘infrastructure of free expression’ ”4—occupy a special place
in society. These organizations “play a central role in the formation and
dissemination of public discourse” (p. 82). By recognizing and respecting
the autonomy of such institutions, the argument goes, courts can promote
discourse, self-actualization, and a richer social environment. They can also
confine the reach of government to its proper, and limited, sphere.
Professor Horwitz is not the first to suggest a structural dimension to
the First Amendment. Nor is he the first to connect structural objectives
with the enterprise of First Amendment institutionalism.5 The value of First
Amendment Institutions comes from developing this position systematically
and in impressive depth. Through his analysis and juxtaposition of various
2. See, e.g., pp. 10–11 (“The new approach will involve broad judicial deference to [First
Amendment] institutions, recognition that they are, in effect, sovereign spheres in their own
right, and a willingness to treat them not as dependents, subject to the doctrine laid down by
the courts, but as partners in shaping First Amendment doctrine.”).
3. I prefer “structural institutionalism” to terms like “institutional pluralism” for reasons of clarity. Jurists and commentators, including Professor Horwitz, sometimes use the
word “pluralism” to indicate the acceptance of “different approaches” to addressing a problem. P. 141; see also Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the
Law v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 3016 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting) (invoking the concept of
pluralism in a similar sense). The concept of “structural institutionalism” focuses less on the
acceptance of divergent approaches and more on the division of power between government,
citizens, and institutions.
I note that my use of the term “structural institutionalism” is unrelated to the use of
terms such as “structuralism” and “institutionalism” in the political science literature. See, e.g.,
Peter A. Hall & Rosemary C.R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, 44
Pol. Stud. 936 (1996).
4. P. 82 (quoting Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 Pepp.
L. Rev. 427, 432 (2009)).
5. See Richard W. Garnett, Religious Liberty, Church Autonomy, and the Structure of
Freedom, in Christianity and Human Rights 267, 276 (John Witte Jr. & Frank S. Alexander
eds., 2010) (“[C]hurch autonomy is — like federalism, like the separation of powers, like
‘checks and balances’ — a structural principle, whose operation enables self-determining religious communities to play a structural role.”); Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First
Amendment, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 1256, 1268–69 (2005) (“[S]ome of the resistance to taking
institutions seriously in the design of First Amendment doctrine may be based on the mistaken belief that the First Amendment exists, at moral bedrock, as an individual right.”).
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institutions, Professor Horwitz advances the argument that “government is
merely one strut” in the “broader infrastructure” of social existence (p. 83).
In so doing, he provides a portrait of structural institutionalism as a constitutional ideal.
That, however, cannot be the endpoint of the institutionalist movement.
If structural institutionalism is a legitimate constitutional theory, it must
emanate from a discernible constitutional source. Notwithstanding his thoroughness in other respects, Professor Horwitz devotes relatively little attention to the question of constitutional foundations. Yet it is ultimately those
foundations that will define structural institutionalism’s scope and determine its validity as a vision of the constitutional order.
This Review begins in Part I by describing the “institutional turn” as a
prescription for constitutional doctrine (p. 68). I focus on the argument’s
two discrete steps of increasing judicial responsiveness to factual context and
acknowledging the considerable autonomy that institutions rightfully possess. In Part II, I contend that Professor Horwitz’s defense of institutionalism is best understood as a wide-ranging theory of constitutional structure.
The theory, which I call structural institutionalism, depicts an array of different institutions as engaged in a joint enterprise to limit the reach of official orthodoxy. As I explain, the markers of structural institutionalism
present themselves in different ways within the various institutions that Professor Horwitz discusses. Finally, Part III integrates structural institutionalism with broader issues of constitutional interpretation by investigating the
theory’s constitutional foundations.
It warrants noting at the outset that this Review does not provide a
normative assessment of First Amendment institutionalism. Instead, my
project is to define the structural implications of the institutionalist position
and to specify the role of constitutional theory in assessing the position’s
validity. These steps, I submit, are necessary predicates to evaluating structural institutionalism on the merits.
I. The Institutional Two-Step
Professor Horwitz’s thesis can be divided into two parts. First, courts
ought to take greater, and more explicit, account of institutional features in
crafting constitutional doctrine. Second, courts ought to respond to institutional features in a particular way. Combining the claims yields what we
might think of as the institutional two-step.
A. From Acontextuality . . .
A popular trope of free speech jurisprudence is the “lonely pamphleteer”6 who agitates for political reform in the face of a government bent on
censoring disfavored ideas (p. 13). The First Amendment wraps itself
around the speaker to protect her from, in John Hart Ely’s words, “the self6. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972).
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serving motives of those in power.”7 But the reality of modern discourse
suggests the need for a richer ideal, one that accounts for the role of institutional actors. Much of the speech that comprises the “market” of ideas8 emanates from institutions like newspapers, universities, and associations.
Institutional actors must take their place alongside the lonely pamphleteer if
we are to fully understand the dynamics and implications of free expression.
Professor Horwitz states the point plainly: “[W]e should take seriously the
simple fact that a good deal of the speech and conduct that makes up some
of the most important aspects of the lived world of First Amendment activity takes place through institutions” (p. 8).
Enriching the prevailing ideal of expressive activity is a common objective among First Amendment institutionalists. While institutionalist scholars
vary in approach—and not all of them would press the case for institutional
autonomy as Professor Horwitz does—they generally agree that courts have
paid too little attention to the distinctive features of groups and organizations. One pioneer of the institutionalist movement is Frederick Schauer,
who urges that First Amendment doctrine be recast to “recognize those informational, investigative, and communicative domains whose more-or-less
distinctive properties warrant special First Amendment treatment.”9 Likewise, Richard Garnett defends an institutionalist view of religious organizations10 and a comparable, though distinct, approach to associations.11 Other
kindred spirits include Joseph Blocher, who emphasizes the role of institutions in promoting a well-functioning marketplace of ideas,12 and John Inazu, who challenges the doctrinal treatment of free assembly and group
autonomy.13 The thoughtful work of these (and other) scholars offers a host
of significant insights, and one of the goals of First Amendment Institutions is
to draw them together in pursuit of an integrated constitutional theory.
Professor Horwitz also devotes substantial attention to defining the
principal problems that institutionalism seeks to rectify. The first pitfall is
“acontextuality,” which refers to “carving up the world into legal concepts
7. P. 262 (quoting John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial
Review 136 n.* (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
8. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
9. Schauer, supra note 5, at 1278.
10. See Garnett, supra note 5, at 269 (“[J]ust as every person ought to be free from
official coercion when it comes to religious practices or professions, religious institutions are
entitled to govern themselves, and to exercise appropriate authority, free from official interference . . . .”).
11. See Richard W. Garnett, The Story of Henry Adams’s Soul: Education and the Expression of Associations, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 1841, 1854 (2001) (urging a shift of “focus from the act
of associating to the structural role of associations themselves”).
12. See Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 Duke L.J. 821, 829
(2008) (“ ‘[S]peech institutions’ deserve deference by lawmakers because, and only to the extent that, they improve the marketplace of ideas.”).
13. See John D. Inazu, Liberty’s Refuge: The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly 150
(2012) (“[W]e have failed to ground protections for group autonomy in an intellectually honest constitutional framework and have relied instead on artificial distinctions and unexamined
premises.”).
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and categories” without adequate attention to factual context (p. 45). We act
acontextually when, for example, we invoke the distinction between public
and private action “to conclude that Harvard University is more like WalMart than it is like the University of Michigan” (p. 17). We commit a similar
mistake when we assume that speech protections should apply no differently
to members of the press than they do to any other citizen (p. 151), and when
we impose abstract labels like “limited public forum” without acknowledging how much factual complexity is being obscured (p. 236).
The danger of acontextuality is that it can lead courts to disregard
“morally relevant details” in resolving disputes (p. 57). Courts that focus
obsessively on the public–private distinction might overlook the fact that
even public universities are “self-regulating autonomous enterprises” that
need discretion to hire and fire faculty if they are to serve their function of
contributing to the creation of knowledge (pp. 113–14). Courts likewise
might overlook the fact that members of the media play a vital role in newsgathering that justifies a “strong constitutional privilege” against the compelled disclosure of sources, even if no comparable privilege is available to
nonjournalists (p. 156). And courts might overlook the fact that associations, as “places in which speech is formed and identities are shaped,” must
possess “the right to exclude unwanted members” regardless of whether doing so runs afoul of antidiscrimination laws or whether such exclusion is
deemed integral to the “clearly articulated message[s]” that the associations
broadcast to the public (pp. 224–25).
Acontextuality is not merely problematic in itself; it also lays a foundation for doctrinal inconsistency. Sometimes, despite the legal system’s best
efforts to operate acontextually, the unique features of institutions become
too compelling to ignore. When irrepressible distinctiveness runs up against
acculturated fidelity to abstract legal categorization, something has to give.
That something, Professor Horwitz contends, is jurisprudential coherence.
Courts respond to fact-intensive and context-sensitive distinctions by distorting predefined legal categories instead of recognizing those categories as
problematic precisely because they do not track the real world (p. 265).
It is debatable whether First Amendment doctrine is as beset by “institutional agnosticism” as Professor Horwitz sometimes suggests.14 The Supreme
Court has developed context-specific frameworks for resolving disputes over
employee speech,15 student speech,16 compelled speech,17 commercial
speech,18 and beyond. Although these frameworks have their weaknesses, it
14. E.g., p. 5.
15. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138
(1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
16. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser,
478 U.S. 675 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
17. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U.S. 705 (1977).
18. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Cent. Hudson Gas
& Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).

962

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 112:957

is not obvious that the weaknesses result from acontextuality as opposed to
other sources.
That said, Professor Horwitz succeeds in showing that in many situations, the Court has given little import to unique institutional characteristics. Professor Horwitz also provides notable illustrations of cases in which
fidelity to abstract categories runs headlong into attention to institutional
distinctiveness, resulting in a mix of institutional agnosticism and institutional responsiveness (pp. 58–63). Particularly evocative is his discussion of
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, where the Court upheld an arts
funding program whose criteria included “general standards of decency and
respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public.”19 As Professor Horwitz explains, “The categorical doctrinal tools available to the
Court seemed to compel the conclusion that the [program] violated the
First Amendment” (p. 61). Only by invoking “[t]he unusual context of arts
funding decisions” was the Court able to avoid the apparent implication of
its preexisting, institutionally agnostic doctrine (p. 61). A similar lesson
emerges from the Court’s treatment of the media, whose uniqueness has at
once been disavowed and indulged (pp. 153–54). Through these examples,
Professor Horwitz demonstrates that courts cannot always swallow the acontextuality they feel bound to espouse.
Like other institutionalists, Professor Horwitz seeks to overcome acontextuality and reorient First Amendment doctrine in real-world characteristics and effects. He does not, of course, go so far as to disavow all abstract
legal categories. Nor does he defend the sort of hyper-contextuality epitomized by Holmes’s famous justice of the peace, who searched in vain for a
law that specifically addressed damage to butter churns.20 The sweet spot for
First Amendment institutionalism is somewhere in the middle: greater sensitivity to the unique factual realities that characterize certain institutions,
coupled with increased transparency about the relevance of those realities to
constitutional adjudication. The goal is to foster a close connection between
constitutional law and “public discourse as we actually experience it” (p.
214).
B.

. . . to Autonomy

There is a sense in which Professor Horwitz’s institutional turn begins
not as a theory of expressive liberty but as a theory of likeness, perhaps even
a theory of precedent. Acontextuality, he contends, prevents us from trusting our intuition that some things clearly belong together and other things
clearly do not (p. 57).
Understanding First Amendment institutionalism as a theory of likeness
helps to determine which precedents are relevant to which new disputes. For
19. 524 U.S. 569, 572 (1998) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
20. P. 42 (citing O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 474–75
(1897)).
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example, the treatment of private universities is relevant to the treatment of
public universities despite the difference in governmental involvement; the
practical and functional similarities between the entities are too salient to
ignore.21 Conversely, cases involving the use of governmental property cannot define the rights of student groups in public universities through the
mechanical extension of “limited public forum” doctrine; the imposition of
abstract legal categories obscures important contextual nuance.22
But examining the ways in which two entities are alike does not settle
how the entities should be treated for First Amendment purposes, and an
institutional focus does not necessarily imply the need for institutional autonomy.23 A Supreme Court that was fiercely protective of expression could
avoid the perils of acontextuality so long as it took account of institutional
differences. So, too, could a Court that viewed freedom of expression as
frequently yielding to reasonable regulation. As long as the Court acknowledged institutional characteristics and made sure to treat like institutions
alike, the requirement of contextual responsiveness would be satisfied.
Whether this resulted in greater or lesser protection of speech would be beside the point.
Professor Horwitz thus adds a second step to his institutional turn.
Rather than contenting himself with drawing attention to institutional characteristics, he urges a particular type of judicial response. It is not enough to
acknowledge the defining features of First Amendment institutions. Courts
must also treat such institutions as possessing autonomy. Institutions are
more than entities whose domain-specific characteristics and expertise warrant judicial acknowledgement. They are self-contained bodies that are
“largely entitled to regulate themselves . . . within some functional limits” (p.
95). They must be recognized as “sovereign spheres of their own, partners
rather than servants in the formation of constitutional meaning” (p. 285).
Be it a university or church, a library or association, an institution stands
shoulder-to-shoulder with the instrumentalities of government.
Autonomy is a striking and powerful word, and the claim that First
Amendment institutions enjoy a sphere of autonomy makes it crucial to
establish workable criteria for defining what a First Amendment institution
is. One prominent characteristic of First Amendment institutions is their
“central role in the formation and dissemination of public discourse” (p.
82). For Professor Horwitz, this entails more than being a forum for the
exchange of views or a vehicle for their dissemination. A First Amendment
institution must also be “foundational or essential to our lives as citizens and
21. See p. 17 (“In many circumstances, it is more useful to think about what kind of
institution we are dealing with than about whether it is a ‘state actor’ or a ‘private actor.’
Sometimes a university is a university, no matter who signs the checks.”).
22. Pp. 137–38 (discussing Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings
Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010)).
23. See Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, 99
Va. L. Rev. 917, 923 (2013) (noting that an institutionalist approach to the First Amendment
does not necessarily “argue for any particular form of institutional autonomy; it merely calls
for attention to the institutional setting”).
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participants in a common culture” (p. 85). So, for example, while business
corporations are surely “relevant to public discourse,” Professor Horwitz denies them institutional status because they are not “fundamental” to the
“infrastructure” of public discourse.24 First Amendment institutions also differ from other entities through “their self-regulating quality,” which provides a source of constraint apart from governmental regulation (p. 86).
Internal and professional “norms, practices, and traditions” can serve “the
broader ends of public discourse” without need for intrusive governmental
oversight (pp. 87–88). These characteristics separate First Amendment institutions from the multitudes of other organizations that play a role in American culture and society.
II. Institutions and Constitutional Structure
Institutional autonomy has a conceptual corollary for defining the
proper role of government. A sphere in which First Amendment institutions
are supreme is a sphere in which government is not. The institutional turn is
not just a recipe for empowering First Amendment institutions. It is a recipe
for limiting government.
It is this limiting function that carries the institutional turn beyond the
domain of expressive liberty to establish it as a sweeping theory of constitutional structure. The specific vision that emerges is one of structural institutionalism: just as the Constitution embodies familiar structural principles of
federalism and separation of powers, it also grants autonomy to First
Amendment institutions as vital safe havens from the threat of governmental
overreaching.
A. Individual Liberty and Governmental Constraint
Institutions are places where people can meet, share and cultivate their
values, and amplify their voices by adding them to a chorus.25 Structural
institutionalism is a means of promoting these benefits. In Professor Horwitz’s view, “If we value individualism we must value institutions as well,
because of what they mean for individual self-development and self-expression” (p. 270).
Equally important are the implications of structural institutionalism for
the organs of the state. Institutional autonomy necessarily limits the power
of government. Much as dividing authority between federal and state governments acts as a check on both, so, too, does vesting autonomy in institutions act as a constraint on governments of all types.26 Structural
24. See p. 244.
25. See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (“An individual’s freedom
to speak, to worship, and to petition the government for the redress of grievances could not be
vigorously protected from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in
group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed.”).
26. Cf. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Private Governments, 78 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 144, 146 (2003) (“By enforcing constitutional rights to protect private organizations
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institutionalism recasts political government as “only one among many sovereigns” (p. 222). This theme pervades Professor Horwitz’s institutionalist
account. Autonomy for religious organizations underscores “the nature and
limits of the state” (p. 177). The family unit serves as a “bulwark against the
state” (p. 240). The value of associations derives in large part from their
status as “threat[s] to the state.”27
The cabining of governmental authority extends to judges—or, as Professor Horwitz describes them, the “guardians of state sovereignty” (p. 224).
Existing jurisprudence “leaves too many decisions in the hands of judges”
(p. 97). Structural institutionalism responds by urging judges to respect the
role of institutions in the “shaping of constitutional meaning” (p. 287). The
role of the courts is not to second-guess institutions’ “self-regulatory norms
and practices” (p. 287); those matters are the province of the institutions
themselves. So long as institutions pursue their “institutional purpose and
function,” and so long as they abide by professional norms and best practices, they are “largely entitled to regulate themselves” (p. 95).
The point of these proposals is not only, or even primarily, to protect
First Amendment institutions as entities. Professor Horwitz contends that a
legal regime that infuses institutions with autonomy is one that best promotes the project of personal liberty. The hoped-for result is similar to the
aspiration of dividing power between state and federal governments: like
federalism, institutionalism “secures the freedom of the individual.”28
B. Applications
The dimensions of structural institutionalism can be sharpened by surveying the various entities that Professor Horwitz would infuse with the status of “First Amendment institutions.” Each example serves to demonstrate,
sometimes in surprising fashion, the proposed role of structural institutionalism in limiting the power of political government.
1. Religious Organizations
It is fairly easy to see how religious organizations can advance the cause
of individual liberty. A citizen’s relationship with spirituality and faith can
. . . courts are actually often performing the same function that they perform when they
enforce ‘structural’ rules such as federalism and separation of powers.”).
27. P. 238; cf. Inazu, supra note 13, at 151 (“Assemblies function in our democratic
structure to challenge and limit the reach of the state.”).
28. Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011) (“Federalism secures the freedom
of the individual” by, among other things, “denying any one government complete jurisdiction
over all the concerns of public life . . . .”); see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181
(1992) (“State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: ‘Rather, federalism secures to citizens the
liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.’ ” (quoting Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting))); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes,
The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1153, 1155
(1992) (“The genius of the American Constitution lies in its use of structural devices to preserve individual liberty.”).
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be central to her identity, fundamentally shaping her outward behavior and
her inward conception of self. Intrusive regulation threatens to diminish the
extent to which religious organizations are able to provide full and meaningful experiences for their members.
Structural institutionalism responds by limiting governmental involvement in religious affairs. As a doctrinal matter, this means that courts must
“avoid intervening” in intrachurch disputes (p. 186). It also means that the
Supreme Court was “quite right” in its recent affirmation of a “ministerial
exception” limiting the application of employment discrimination laws.29
Professor Horwitz contends that “the hiring and firing of an employee of a
religious organization[ ]remains squarely within the core of the religious
entity’s sovereignty, whatever the reasons for that decision may be” (p. 188).
Religious institutions are subject to governmental oversight in certain circumstances, including instances of sexual abuse; structural institutionalism
is consistent with “state intervention . . . when an institution abuses its own
members” (p. 189). But the general approach of the courts must be to respect religious entities as “quasi-sovereign spheres” (p. 190).
By safeguarding religious autonomy, structural institutionalism seeks to
help individuals find their own “sources of meaning” (p. 193). And not just
any sources of meaning: sources that are insulated from state control. The
flip side of viewing religious institutions “as sovereign spheres” is acknowledging “limits on the state’s power to circumscribe” (p. 193). Religious autonomy forces the government to “recognize that there are other sovereigns”
acting within its borders (p. 193). The relationship between the federal government and the states is only one aspect of the constitutional order. Religious institutions must also be part of the conversation.
2. Associations
Nonreligious associations have a prominent role to play in the landscape
of structural institutionalism. Civic and social organizations disseminate
messages and furnish their individual members with an outlet for doing the
same. They also facilitate “social relationships” that “can be central to the
formation of our identities” (p. 221). This depiction calls to mind John McGinnis’s argument, drawing on Tocqueville’s observations, that “civil associations are even better than states at generating social norms so long as
these associations cannot coerce individuals to subscribe to them.”30
As a doctrinal matter, the Supreme Court has tethered the First Amendment protection of associations to their expressive function. Hence the
rather remarkable opinions in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, which chronicle

29. P. 187 (discussing Hosanna–Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132
S. Ct. 694 (2012)).
30. John O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 Calif. L. Rev. 485, 497 (2002).
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the efforts of competing groups of justices to decipher the Boy Scouts’ official views on homosexuality.31 The Dale majority concluded that the inclusion of gay scoutmasters would “affect[ ] in a significant way the group’s
ability to advocate public or private viewpoints,”32 while the dissenters countered that the Boy Scouts had “fail[ed] to connect its alleged policy [forbidding gay scoutmasters] to its expressive activities.”33 Professor Horwitz
reminds us that, notwithstanding the Court’s “emphasis on expressive association,” institutions can help their members exercise liberty in ways beyond
the dissemination of an official organizational message (p. 225). He proposes that the “concern should be with associational autonomy, not associational expression” (p. 225). Regardless of “whether an association . . . is
expressing a clearly articulated message,” the proper question is simply
“whether it is an association” (p. 225).
Again, this type of argument has salient implications for the power of
government vis-à-vis other institutional actors. As with religious institutions, the value of associations derives in significant part from their status as
“refuges” from governmental orthodoxy.34 Whatever meaning an association’s members construct by virtue of their participation in the associational
community, that meaning is valuable to the extent that—and because—the
government cannot change it. For the structural institutionalist, the autonomy of associations is just as much about “contest[ing] the limits of state
power” as it is about protecting associational activity and expression (p.
212).
3. The Press
The media play an “infrastructural role in public discourse” by “enabl[ing] citizens to engage in informed discussions, decisions, and actions in
social life” (p. 151). That role, combined with the media’s professionalism
and self-regulatory norms, supports their treatment as First Amendment institutions under Professor Horwitz’s approach (p. 146).
The trickier issue is whether media autonomy fits the theory of structural institutionalism that I have described. Religious organizations and civil
associations provide settings where their members can create bonds and cultivate their views and beliefs. Media outlets do not fit this mold. Although
journalists undoubtedly enhance their sense of self through their chosen vocation, newsgathering bodies do not relate to their employees in the same
way that churches and associations relate to their members.
Nevertheless, media autonomy fits easily into the theory of structural
institutionalism. It simply takes a different shape. The press acts as an “institutional watchdog” (p. 149) and a source of “ ‘organized, expert scrutiny of
31. 530 U.S. 640, 650–53 (2000); Dale, 530 U.S. at 665–77 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 648 (majority opinion).
33. Id. at 677 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
34. P. 222; see also Garnett, supra note 11, at 1853 (“[Associations serve as] wrenches in
the works of whatever hegemonizing ambitions government might be tempted to indulge.”).
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government.’ ”35 This occurs directly through journalistic reports about the
activities of governmental actors. It happens more subtly when the media’s
contributions to the public repository of knowledge facilitate the development of “good republican citizens” who are “informed about the issues of
the day” (p. 148). There are few better checks on government than an engaged and knowledgeable citizenry.36
To fulfill these complementary roles of governmental watchdog and
facilitator of civic participation, the media must have the authority to undertake their “core institutional functions” without governmental interference
(p. 155). For Professor Horwitz, that authority clearly entails a constitutional privilege for journalists to keep their sources confidential (p. 156). It
may also include media exemptions from generally applicable laws based on
activities such as publishing confidential information and promising anonymity to a source (pp. 157–58). After the institutional turn, it is emphatically not the case that “everyone has the same obligations under the law” (p.
159). The media “serve[ ]the needs of the public” in a distinctive, valuable
way, which justifies special legal treatment and extra insulation from governmental regulation (p. 159).
4. Universities
Professor Horwitz vigorously defends the autonomy of universities.
That autonomy encompasses decisions about whom to hire, promote, and
fire (p. 122). It empowers universities to determine whether student welfare
is best served by a no-holds-barred environment for speech as opposed to a
highly restrictive speech code (pp. 127–28). And it affords discretion in the
admission of students, even on controversial bases such as race (pp.
125–26). To function as “training grounds for public discourse” and places
“[w]here [i]deas [b]egin,” universities must have room to make these types
of decisions without intrusive judicial oversight (p. 107).
A conceptual wrinkle is that Professor Horwitz’s argument applies to
both private universities and public ones—and yet public universities are the
government. Treating public universities as autonomous institutions is tantamount to shuffling authority from one organ of government to another.
The allocation of discretion to public universities might be beneficial, or it
might be detrimental. But so long as the authority remains in the hands of a
governmental actor, structural institutionalism seemingly has no role to
play.
Or does it? Professor Horwitz describes the proper treatment of public
universities as follows: When a university asserts a right to be free from
35. P. 145 (quoting Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press”, 26 Hastings L.J. 631, 634 (1975)).
36. Cf. Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause (pt. 1), 98 Geo.
L.J. 1241, 1249 (2010) (“The self-serving, and sometimes corrupt, actions of the post-Revolutionary state governments fueled the emergence of a particular strain of popular sovereignty
that viewed the people as both sovereign and distinct from their institutions of government,
including the legislative branch.”).
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regulation, the judicial inquiry turns on whether the school policy in question “was the product of a genuine academic judgment, broadly understood” (p. 138). If the university has exercised its academic judgment, it will
be treated as an autonomous institution that is “entitled to shape [its] own
mission[ ]” (p. 132). But that autonomy extends only to the university’s academic self. Thus, if the university stops pursuing its academic mission and
starts acting like a politically responsive body, the autonomy disappears. The
primacy of academic mission explains how Professor Horwitz is able to treat
private universities and public universities alike. Once politics are brushed
aside, all universities—whether public or private—are defined by their academic “nature” and the “role [they] play[ ] in public discourse” (p. 102).
To be sure, it will sometimes be difficult to draw the line between political and academic judgments. But the distinction comports with the theory
of structural institutionalism. A First Amendment institution’s value is in
facilitating the exercise of liberty and the exploration of ideas in a space that
is free from governmental intrusion. Notwithstanding their technical status
as arms of the government, public universities can promote these goals so
long as they are exercising professional judgment rather than pursuing political agendas. Through this effective depoliticization, public universities are
enlisted in the project of checking the state.
We can underscore the point by juxtaposing Professor Horwitz’s treatment of universities against his discussion of public schools at the elementary and secondary levels. Despite acknowledging the social significance of
elementary and secondary schools, Professor Horwitz describes them as
presenting only a “[b]orderline” case for autonomy (p. 141). These entities
are less concerned than are universities with the production and dissemination of new ideas (p. 143). Another critical difference from the perspective
of structural institutionalism is that public schools can be “more like other
government actors than like unique institutions” because they depend more
heavily on “public decisions by public representatives such as elected school
boards” (p. 143). The prevalence of electoral politics prevents the separation
of the school as a professional institution from the school as a governmental
body. Professor Horwitz responds by proposing a distinction that resembles
his approach to public universities: When schools are “clearly follow[ing]
political rather than professional norms,” no autonomy is warranted (pp.
142–43). By contrast, when schools function as “professional and not just
representative institutions,” the prospect of autonomy should emerge (p.
143). Autonomy begins where politics ends. That is how structural institutionalism works.
5. Libraries
Libraries can find themselves at the center of First Amendment disputes
over issues such as the removal of controversial books and the installation of
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internet filters.37 When such disputes arise, the special role of libraries as
“places where views are shaped and changed,” as well as their reliance on
“professional norms and self-regulation,” justifies their treatment as autonomous institutions under Professor Horwitz’s approach (pp. 194, 198).
As with universities, the status of libraries is complicated by the fact that
many libraries are themselves instrumentalities of government. If structural
institutionalism emphasizes the limited domain of governmental authority,
how can recognizing autonomy in a government-run organization help the
cause? Professor Horwitz’s answer, once again, is to compartmentalize the
influence of politics. At their best, libraries are independent, professional
organizations rather than “whatever governments declare them to be” (p.
195). Likewise, they deserve autonomy only to the extent that their practices
are “insulat[ed] . . . from political control” (p. 208). By separating the concepts of professional and political influence, what initially seems like the
preservation of governmental power becomes a way to underscore “the limits of government control over First Amendment institutions—even when
those institutions are publicly funded” (p. 195).
III. Structural Institutionalism and Constitutional Theory
In its most aggressive form, First Amendment institutionalism seeks to
deploy nonpolitical institutions as counterweights against governmental authority. This necessarily calls for recognizing spheres of institutional autonomy that are beyond governmental control. What emerges is a vision of
constitutional structure aimed at altering the balance of power between political government and First Amendment institutions.
Seeking to reconceptualize the constitutional status of First Amendment
institutions carries a hefty burden. The burden is greater, I submit, than it is
for criticisms of Supreme Court decisions that are framed in the decisions’
own terms. It is common for criticism of the Court’s decisions to take the
following form: even if we generally accept the theories and policies that the
Court has described as relevant to resolving certain types of disputes, the
Court’s decisions do not support those theories or advance those policies in
the way the Court has asserted or intended.
One reason why this style of argument is prevalent is that it allows commentators to bypass the articulation and defense of fundamental normative
and philosophical commitments. Even if I have not made up my mind between, say, originalism and living constitutionalism, I can construct an argument as to whether the Court’s conclusions in a given case follow from its
premises. I can also evaluate whether the Court has disregarded factors that
ought to be relevant based on the underlying theoretical drivers it has cited
or implied.
37. For a recent treatment of the latter issue, see United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539
U.S. 194, 214 (2003) (plurality opinion), which concluded that “[b]ecause public libraries’ use
of Internet filtering software does not violate their patrons’ First Amendment rights, [the relevant statute] does not induce libraries to violate the Constitution, and is a valid exercise of
Congress’ spending power.”
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What Professor Horwitz calls the “weakest” version of First Amendment
institutionalism follows this basic formula.38 The asserted problem with the
Court’s approach is insufficient attention to contextual realities and the
unique characteristics of institutional actors. That deficiency prevents the
Court from achieving what it sets out to achieve: striking the appropriate
balance between expressive liberty and competing concerns. The solution is
to leave much of the Court’s theoretical groundwork intact but to enhance it
with greater attention to institutional features.
I have claimed that First Amendment institutionalism, at least the potent version that emerges in Professor Horwitz’s account, extends beyond
the criticism of discrete Supreme Court cases. The theory presents an alternative vision of the constitutional order that reallocates authority among
institutional actors. Such a theory requires more to sustain than does a challenge to a particular decision or line of decisions.
Yet Professor Horwitz says relatively little about institutionalism’s constitutional foundations. The explanation may be that he understands his
pragmatic justifications for institutionalism as themselves representing constitutional arguments. By “pragmatic,” I mean the view that the Constitution should be interpreted using a methodology that invokes numerous
sources of meaning while retaining a primary focus on “purposes and consequences.”39 Pragmatism might be employed to defend structural institutionalism in the aggregate, or it might lead to independent inquiries into the
autonomy of each discrete category of First Amendment institution. Either
way, functional and practical considerations would drive the discussion.
A pragmatic defense of structural institutionalism is not the same as an
argument that governmental actors should, as a matter of sound policy,
delegate substantial authority to First Amendment institutions. The latter
approach would conflict with the view of institutional autonomy as a baseline constitutional principle that is beyond the government’s power to alter.40 Instead, the argument must be that a pragmatic reading of the
Constitution requires the recognition of spheres of autonomy outside political government, regardless of whether the instrumentalities of government
perceive those spheres as good or bad.
First Amendment Institutions is susceptible to this type of pragmatic
reading. Professor Horwitz is well aware of the drawbacks of institutionalism. He regularly acknowledges the objections to his prescriptions and devotes a brief chapter to unpacking them (Chapter 11). He seems to conclude
that the benefits outweigh the costs. While history and tradition may help to
38. See Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and
Spheres, 44 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 79, 88 (2009) (“Under this approach, courts would incorporate a substantial degree of deference to the factual claims of [First Amendment] institutions in considering how present doctrine should apply to them.”).
39. Stephen Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work 74 (2010).
40. Cf. Michael W. McConnell, Non-State Governance, 2010 Utah L. Rev. 7, 7 (criticizing the argument that “any space that may be reserved for non-state entities to control their
own affairs is itself a product of state action”).
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identify which institutions play critical roles in the infrastructure of expressive liberty,41 the core justification for institutional autonomy can be viewed
as pragmatic and functional: it is based on the net benefits that flow from
protecting spheres of institutional autonomy.
Yet it is not entirely clear whether Professor Horwitz’s institutionalism is
a pragmatic theory. And even if it is, uncertainty remains regarding institutionalism’s reach. In particular, what about those who are skeptical of pragmatism as a general theory of constitutional interpretation? Does structural
institutionalism have anything to say to them? The question is an important
one, for the ultimate success of First Amendment institutionalism as a scholarly enterprise will depend on its ability to appeal to judges and constitutional lawyers of varying methodological predilections.
In the Sections below, I offer preliminary thoughts about how we might
view structural institutionalism through the lens of some leading theories of
constitutional interpretation.
A. Text, Structure, and Original Meaning
The threshold issue posed by structural institutionalism is its compatibility with the First Amendment’s text. One option for testing this compatibility is to take a clause-by-clause approach. The autonomy of religious
institutions might trace back to the Free Exercise or Establishment Clauses.
The autonomy of the media might trace back to the Press Clause. The autonomy of associations might trace back to the Assembly Clause. And organizations such as universities and libraries might be sufficiently enmeshed in
the creation and dissemination of knowledge to receive their autonomy via
the Speech Clause. Alternatively, structural institutionalism could emerge
from the First Amendment’s clauses as viewed in the aggregate: the idea
would be that the enumeration of the Amendment’s various freedoms, when
taken together, establishes a basis for autonomy across First Amendment
institutions.
Under either the clause-by-clause or aggregated approach, the textualist
defense of structural institutionalism requires extensive analytical work. It is
putting the point mildly to say that the First Amendment’s bare text does
not, on its own, provide a clear basis for institutional autonomy. To supplement the text, one might turn to history, asking whether there is a historical
basis for interpreting the First Amendment’s text to protect certain spheres
of institutional autonomy.42 The Amendment’s text might also be supplemented by means of constitutional “construction.” Where the Constitution’s
41. E.g., pp. 86, 148–49.
42. There have been particularly notable efforts in this spirit with respect to religious
autonomy. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg et al., Religious Freedom, Church–State Separation, and the
Ministerial Exception, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 175, 181 (2011) (“In rejecting a national
establishment of religion, Americans necessarily rejected a role for the federal government to
choose church leaders. The First Amendment confirms this rejection, as do early practices and
policies.”); Douglas Laycock, Church Autonomy Revisited, 7 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 253, 260
(2009) (“I still believe that the most straightforward way to explain the church autonomy cases
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linguistic meaning is underdeterminate, principles of construction serve as
tools for filling the void.43 Perhaps the institutionalist understanding of the
First Amendment reflects one such principle. We would still need a normative theory to explain why we should resolve linguistic underdeterminacy in
favor of structural institutionalism rather than in some other way.44 But assuming that such a theory were available, structural institutionalism could
theoretically be consistent with text-centric or originalist modes of interpretation notwithstanding the First Amendment’s fairly general language.
Much the same would be true if structural institutionalism were defended as an implementing or prophylactic principle for protecting constitutional liberties that are enumerated in the Constitution. Such an approach
might suggest, for example, that there can be no effective freedom of religion
without church autonomy, no effective freedom of the press without media
autonomy, and no effective freedom of speech without autonomy for organizations such as universities, libraries, and associations. The premise would
be that structural institutionalism is the best means of implementing the
First Amendment’s textual commands.45
One must also keep in mind that the First Amendment does not exist in
a vacuum. As I have suggested, structural institutionalism carries ramifications for the broader division of power within American society. These
ramifications could implicate other aspects of the constitutional order. To
take just one example, it is worth asking how structural institutionalism
might interact with provisions like the Ninth and Tenth Amendments,
which play a role—albeit one that scholars continue to debate46—in defining
is in terms of free exercise and not in terms of establishment. But I am now more open to
Establishment Clause explanations, because I am much more aware now . . . that the formally
established church was a church controlled by the state.”); cf. Richard W. Garnett, The Freedom of the Church, 4 J. Cath. Soc. Thought 59, 76 (2007) (“[I]t remains unclear and unsettled what exactly are the content and textual home in the Constitution for the churchautonomy principle—or even, indeed, if there is such a ‘principle.’ ”); Michael A. Helfand,
Fighting for the Debtor’s Soul: Regulating Religious Commercial Conduct, 19 Geo. Mason L.
Rev. 157, 177 (2011) (noting that “courts and scholars have long differed as to the constitutional origins of the [church autonomy] doctrine,” which restricts judicial resolution of religious questions).
43. Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation–Construction Distinction, 27 Const. Comment. 95, 106 (2010) (“Interpretation discerns linguistic meaning, but when a text is vague,
then the output of interpretation (the semantic content of the text) is vague. In such cases . . .
interpretation makes its exit and construction enters the scene.”).
44. See id. at 104 (“[T]heories of construction are ultimately normative theories . . . .”).
45. On constitutional implementation generally, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword:
Implementing the Constitution, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 54 (1997).
46. Compare, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution 366 (rev. ed.
2013) (“If it is the people as individuals who are sovereign, and the people as individuals retain
their preexisting rights, as is affirmed in the text of the Constitution by the Ninth Amendment,
then we are faced with the issue of what the people could have consented to.” (footnote omitted)), with, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Inescapable Federalism of the Ninth Amendment, 93 Iowa L.
Rev. 801, 805 (2008) (“[There is] a substantial body of evidence indicating that the Ninth
Amendment was conceived and received as a federalist provision preserving the people’s retained right to local self-government.”).
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the distribution of rights and obligations under the Constitution. It is also
worth considering whether the institutional turn in First Amendment jurisprudence would denigrate rights granted to individuals. To be sure, Professor Horwitz emphasizes that the institutional turn is focused on enhancing
individual liberty, not reducing it.47 But in the context of specific altercations
between individuals and institutions—for instance, the public university
student or professor who is subjected to stringent speech restrictions (pp.
126–30)—it is hard not to perceive institutional autonomy and individual
interests as standing in tension.
Of course, I do not mean to claim in this limited space that text-centric
defenses of structural institutionalism are valid or invalid. I aim simply to
sketch the styles of argument that might be used to evaluate structural institutionalism as a constitutional theory.
B. Common Law Constitutionalism
Another potential justification for structural institutionalism comes
from the common law approach to constitutional interpretation. From the
perspective of common law constitutionalism, considerations of text and
structure would remain relevant, but the central question would be whether
one could describe structural institutionalism as a migration of existing case
law toward a sounder jurisprudential approach.48 Precedent, tradition, and
morally desirable results would become the theory’s legitimating forces.
Some constitutional lawyers resist common law constitutionalism as a
normative theory of interpretation, just as some resist the primacy of factors
such as original meaning. But for those who accept common law constitutionalism as an interpretive approach, the validity of structural institutionalism would depend on factors including its role in facilitating an incremental
change from what courts are already doing. For the common law constitutionalist, existing precedent serves to “define and limit the role” of normative judgments in shaping the law.49 Sharp breaks are appropriate only in
rare circumstances presenting the most compelling of moral justifications.50
Were the situation otherwise, common law constitutionalism would become
unconstrained by precedent—a contradiction in terms.
To assess its consistency with common law constitutionalism, we must
view structural institutionalism against the backdrop of existing jurisprudence. Here the evidence is mixed. On the one hand, Professor Horwitz
describes existing law as deviating from the institutionalist ideal in myriad
47. See, e.g., p. 21 (“Nothing in what I write is intended to eliminate vigorous protections
for individual speakers or worshippers.”).
48. For an influential articulation of common law constitutionalism, see David A.
Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877 (1996).
49. David A. Strauss, Originalism, Precedent, and Candor, 22 Const. Comment. 299, 300
(2005).
50. See David A. Strauss, The Common Law Genius of the Warren Court, 49 Wm. & Mary
L. Rev. 845, 859 (2007) (“A sharp, nonincremental change can be justified if you are very
confident that what has gone before is badly wrong.”).
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ways.51 On the other hand, he states that “the institutional turn signifies a
partial change in First Amendment doctrine, not a total makeover.” (p. 278).
The question is how “partial” that change really is. It may be that with respect to some institutions, the move to institutional autonomy could be justified as an incremental extension of existing case law. The government’s
treatment of religious institutions is a potential example, particularly given
the Supreme Court’s recent validation of the ministerial exemption as reflecting a church’s freedom “to choose those who will guide it on its way.”52
The treatment of associations is a closer call. The Court in Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale was undoubtedly protective of associational freedom,53 but
its focus on parsing the Boy Scouts’ organizational message conflicts with
Professor Horwitz’s proposed approach to associational autonomy (p. 225).
Could the other doctrinal innovations implied by structural institutionalism
be described as incremental changes to existing law? If not, are the changes
so vital from the standpoint of morality or policy that they warrant even a
stark change of direction? One of these questions must be answered in the
affirmative for structural institutionalism to find a basis in common law
constitutionalism.
C. Arguments from First Amendment Values
First Amendment case law is home to a range of animating values.
Among them are governmental distrust,54 individual expression,55 democratic self-governance,56 and the pursuit of truth via an “uninhibited marketplace of ideas.”57 Perhaps structural institutionalism is an outgrowth of
these values. After all, structural institutionalism envisions certain organizations as bulwarks against the imposition of governmental orthodoxy and
domains for the exercise of liberty. We might also defend the theory as enriching the marketplace of ideas, a point that emerges most clearly from
51. P. 49 (“In some cases, the courts are insensitive to contextual and institutional differences that should matter. In others, the courts are sensitive to differences in context, but feel
compelled to shoehorn their decisions into an acontextual framework.”).
52. Hosanna–Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710
(2012).
53. See McGinnis, supra note 30, at 533 (“By granting such substantial space for a private
organization to exclude individuals whose mere presence is antithetical to their expressive
norms, the Court turned the First Amendment into a powerful tool for private articulation of
social norms about individual behavior and characteristics.”).
54. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (“Premised on mistrust of
governmental power, the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects
or viewpoints.”).
55. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n.12 (1978) (“The
individual’s interest in self-expression is a concern of the First Amendment separate from the
concern for open and informed discussion . . . .”).
56. See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964) (“[S]peech concerning
public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.”).
57. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003).
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Professor Horwitz’s discussion of universities and the media as contributing
to the store of public knowledge.58
To the extent that the First Amendment is properly viewed as aspiring to
promote these sorts of values, structural institutionalism’s desirability depends on its ability to advance that enterprise.59 Yet there is also a set of
deeper questions: What makes a particular First Amendment value worth
pursuing in the first place? Must the value be implicit in the Constitution’s
text or original meaning? Does it draw its legitimacy from a pedigree in
judicial precedent? Is the value a heuristic for achieving pragmatically desirable results? Even if it were linked to underlying First Amendment values,
the validity of structural institutionalism would still depend on these fundamental issues regarding the proper ends of constitutional adjudication.
D. Synthesis
I have offered these preliminary thoughts to emphasize the nature of
First Amendment institutionalism as a theory of constitutional structure
that must emanate from an identifiable constitutional source. Like other debates over constitutional adjudication, the debate over institutionalism will
depend on considerations of interpretive methodology as well as the normative premises that drive methodological choices.60 For present purposes, my
point is simply that the debate is worth having. Professor Horwitz has advanced a potent theory of structural institutionalism that would, if implemented, alter the balance of political and nonpolitical authority in American
society. The theory raises numerous issues, but none is more important than
pinning down its constitutional basis.
A final inquiry in evaluating structural institutionalism’s foundations is
how many arguments are in motion: one or more than one? It may be that
the theory should stand or fall as a cohesive whole. That understanding is
consistent with the spirit of Professor Horwitz’s argument, which reads as a
single overarching thesis with several complementary parts. The view of
structural institutionalism as a unified theory also gives it a broad sweep,
depicting institutional autonomy as a concept that is bigger than any particular First Amendment institution. Institutionalists might prefer some autonomy to none, such that the recognition of autonomy for, say, churches or
universities but not the media would nevertheless represent a partial victory.
Still, the stronger version of structural institutionalism is the integrated one,
58. See supra Sections II.B.3–4.
59. Although he did not frame his argument in institutionalist terms, Ashutosh Bhagwat
recently defended associational freedom by connecting it to democratic self-governance. See
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 Yale L.J. 978, 993 (2011) (“[G]roup action was
and is an essential aspect of meaningful self-governance.”).
60. See Randy J. Kozel, Settled Versus Right: Constitutional Method and the Path of Precedent, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 1843, 1863–75 (2013) (describing the relationship between interpretive
methodology, underlying normative premises, and constitutional adjudication in the context
of the treatment of judicial precedent).
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which enlists various entities in a joint effort to limit the reach of government. It is that version whose constitutional moorings are of greatest interest
in assessing the implications and legitimacy of First Amendment
institutionalism.
Conclusion
The institutional turn in First Amendment scholarship is a going concern, and Professor Horwitz provides an excellent introduction to the debate. That alone makes his book worthy of attention.
But something else is going on—something that is relevant to anyone
interested in the distribution of power in American society. I have suggested
that through his systematic approach and his dual emphasis on empowering
institutions and constraining governments, Professor Horwitz demonstrates
the potential of First Amendment institutionalism to move beyond freedom
of expression by engaging the deeper structure of the constitutional order.
The resulting theory presents a significant challenge to the existing relationship between governments, individuals, and organizations.
The U.S. Constitution is manifestly concerned with the distribution of
power among instrumentalities of government: state versus federal, executive versus legislative versus judicial, Senate versus House. If Professor Horwitz is right, there is another part of the story—one that the First
Amendment helps us understand but whose effects extend far beyond the
protection of expressive liberty. As the structural dimensions of First
Amendment institutionalism become more apparent, the need for a fuller
exploration of its implications for constitutional theory will take on increased urgency. That undertaking might well represent the next front in the
institutionalist project.
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